Foreign Statutory Response to Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Laws by Cannon, John, III
Penn State International Law Review
Volume 1
Number 1 Dickinson International Law Annual Article 7
1982
Foreign Statutory Response to Extraterritorial
Application of U.S. Antitrust Laws
John Cannon III
Follow this and additional works at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Penn State Law eLibrary. It has been accepted for inclusion in Penn State International
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Penn State Law eLibrary. For more information, please contact ram6023@psu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cannon, John III (1982) "Foreign Statutory Response to Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Laws," Penn State International
Law Review: Vol. 1: No. 1, Article 7.
Available at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr/vol1/iss1/7
FOREIGN STATUTORY RESPONSE TO EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION
OF UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAW
I. Introduction
In theory, "jurisdiction is . . territorial; it can-
not be exercised by a state outside its territory .... Ill
In fact, states frequently apply their laws extraterritori-
ally, by asserting jurisdiction over their nationals located
in other countries. Intergovernmental disputes commonly
result. For the individuals or entities involved, such
conflicts can generate problems of considerable proportion.
Multinational corporations are particularly vulnerable.
The typical multinational corporation strives to adhere to
the laws of each country in which it conducts business.
That goal is not always attainable. For example, assume
the laws of State A, where part of a company is located,
require the entire corporation to follow a pattern of be-
havior that is inconsistent with the laws of State B,
where another part of the corporation is located. Com-
pliance with the laws of one state violates the laws of the
2
other. The choice is often painful, but transnational
companies are increasingly obliged to make it.
1. The S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J., Ser. A
No. 10 at 18.
2. A similar situation occurred when President Reagan
decided to prohibit American made equipment or technology
from being used in constructing Russia's natural gas pipe-
line. The United States government ordered a French sub-
sidiary of Dresser Industries, Inc., Dallas, Tex., not to
ship three compressors manufactured in France but of Ameri-
can design. The French government demanded that Dresser's
subsidiary honor French contracts with the Russians and
ship the equipment. On August 26, 1982, the compressors
were loaded aboard a vessel bound for the Soviet Union. The
Commerce Department immediately announced trade sanctions
against Dresser's subsidiary, barring it from receiving
further American products or technology.
Additional complications occur when jurisdiction is
claimed over foreign corporations not present within the
borders of the nation attempting to assert authority. The
United States has sought to extend its antitrust law in
precisely that manner, a practice marked by bitter inter-
3
national debate. One foreign tribunal has characterized
American claims to jurisdiction as "excessive and . . . an
invasion of sovereignty." 4 Other countries have reacted
with a variety of countermeasures ranging from diplomatic
protest 5 to legislation designed to subvert American at-
tempts at foreign discovery and, in some cases, nullify
American judgments abroad.
6
By no means is criticism of United States regulatory
7
policy limited to antitrust matters. Attempts to regulate
or investigate companies domiciled and operating completely
outside the United States by the Securities & Exchange
3. See generally Comment, Sherman Act Jurisdiction and
the Acts of Foreign Sovereigns, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 1247 (1977) [here-
inafter cited as Comment]; Pettit & Styles, The Interna-
tional Response to the Extraterritorial Application of
United States Antitrust Laws, 37 Bus. Law. 697 (1982) [here-
inafter cited as Pettit & Styles]; Ongman, "Be no Longer a
Chaos": Constructing a Normative Theory of the Sherman Act's
Extraterritorial Jurisdictional Scope, 71 Nw. U.L. Rev. 733
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Ongman]; Gordon, Extraterritorial
Application of United States Economic Laws, 14 Int'l Law. 155
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Gordon]; Comment, Foreign Non-
disclosure Laws and Domestic Discovery Orders in Antitrust
Litigation, 88 Yale L.J. 612 (1979); Fugate, Antitrust Jur-
isdiction and Foreign Sovereignty, 49 Va. L. Rev. 925 (1963);
Jones, Extraterritoriality in U.S. Antitrust: An Interna-
tional "Hot Potato", 11 Int'l Law. 415 (1977).
4. Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,
[1978] A.C. 547, 631.
5. See, e.g., British protests, reprinted in Interna-
tional Law Association, Report of the Fifty-First Con-
ference, 404, 579, 582 (1964) [hereinafter cited as ILA].
6. E.g., Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, c.ll.
7. See, e.g., Sandberg, The Extraterritorial Reach of
American Economic Regulation: The Case of Securities Law,
17 Harv. Int'l L.J. 315 (1976).
Commission, 8 the Federal Trade Commission 9 and the Federal
10
Maritime Commission have also provoked foreign diplomatic
and judicial rebuke.
1 1
This comment will outline the international response
to extraterritorial application of United States antitrust
law, focusing primarily on foreign statutory enactments.
Following a brief review of United States antitrust legis-
lation, American case law will be analyzed. The next
section of the inquiry will consist of an examination of
the so-called "blocking statutes" of eight major United
States trading partners. Finally, alternative solutions to
the conflict will be outlined.
II. United States Antitrust Law
The antitrust law of the United States has been de-
scribed as "perhaps the most fundamental and pervasive
adoption of the competitive system to be found in the na-
tional laws of any country." 1 2 The Sherman Act 1 3 is the
core of American antitrust law. Section 1 forbids "[e]very
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise or
conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several states, or with foreign nations. " 1 4 Section 2 bans
8. E.g., Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Max-
well, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
9. E.g., FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-
Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300 (D.D.C. 1979).
10. E.g., Re Grand Jury Investigation of the Shipping
Industry, 186 F. Supp. 298 (D.D.C. 1960).
11. E.g., Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp., [1978] A.C. 547.
12. C. Fulda & W. Schwartz, Regulation of International
Trade and Investment 17 (1970).
13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) (emphasis added).
monopolies and attempts or conspiracies to monopolize "any
part of the trade or commerce among the several states or
with foreign nations."
1 5
The Sherman Act is supplemented by similarly designed
16
statutes. The Clayton Act, most notable of these, is
directed against the formation of monopolies through anti-
competitive practices. A related statute is the Wilson
17
Tariff Act, which protects American imports from agree-
ments in restraint of free trade. Paradoxically, Congress
18
has also enacted the Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act. It
permits certain anti-competitive actions by United States
exporters in the international market. Given the vociferous
American response to like practices by foreign exporters in
the same market, it is not surprising that the United States
is accused of applying a double standard.
1 9
It is the Sherman Act which is most often invoked in
the international forum. A properly stated claim for relief
under the Act consists of two conjunctive elements. Subject
matter jurisdiction is established by a showing that the
facts of the alleged violation constitute restraint of
trade or commerce "among the several states, or with foreign
nations." 20 A substantive violation of the Act is found if
the alleged facts demonstrate actual "restraint of trade or
commerce."
2 1 
Both elements must be proven to prevent dis-
22
missal of the complaint. When applied abroad, however,
15. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976) (emphasis added).
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
17. 15 U.S.C. 99 8-11 (1976).
18. 15 U.S.C. 99 61-65 (1976).
19. See Pettit & Styles, supra note 3, at 699.
20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1,2 (1976).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
22. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d
597 (9th Cir. 1976).
uncertainty exists as to the Sherman Act's jurisdictional
scope and the elements required to state a claim for relief.
The confusion stems largely from the erratic course of
American case law.
2 3
III. American Case Law and the Extraterritorial Reach of
United States Antitrust Law
Although the text of the Sherman Act twice refers to
24
"foreign nations", it fails to give any indication as to
the extent of its extraterritorial reach. The statute's
legislative history is no more enlightening. It has, there-
fore, devolved to the federal courts 2 5 to delineate the
limits of the Sherman Act's jurisdictional sweep. That task
implicitly requires that a balance be struck between ful-
filling a congressional mandate to enforce United States
antitrust law, while avoiding judicial encroachment on the
foreign policy prerogatives of the executive and legislative
26
branches. After some ninety years, federal courts still
grapple with the problem, often with inconsistent results.
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. 2 7 was the
first antitrust case concerning foreign commerce to reach
the Supreme Court of the United States. Both parties were
American corporations. Plaintiff alleged that trade in
bananas between Costa Rica and the United States was mono-
polized by the defendant with the assistance of the Costa
Rican government. The Court, per Justice Holmes, held that
23. See Ongman, supra note 3, at 765-6.
24. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1,2 (1976).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1976).
26. See Comment, supra note 3, at 1247.
27. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
the complaint failed to state a cause of action. The Sher-
man Act was interpreted as ineffective when applied to acts
committed outside the United States, particularly when not
illegal in the country in which they occurred. Justice
Holmes wrote:
[T]he general and almost universal rule is that
the character of an act as lawful or unlawful
must be determined wholly by the law of the
country where the act is done . . .. For
another jurisdiction, if it should happen to
lay hold of the actor, to treat him according
to its own notions rather than those of the
place where he did the acts, not only would be
unjust, but would be an interference with the
authority of another sovereign, contrary to the
comity of nations, which the other state con-
cerned justly might resent.
The foregoing consideration would lead in
case of doubt to a construction of any statute
as confined in its operations and effect to the
territorial limits over which the lawmaker has
general and legitimate power. All legislation
is prima facie territorial.
2 8
Two years later, the "territorial" approach taken in
American Banana was qualified by the Court's decision in
United States v. American Tobacco Co. 2 9 The defendant
American corporation executed an agreement in England to
allocate tobacco markets and thereby reduce competition in
the United States. Although the agreement was reached out-
side the United States, the Court nonetheless determined
that both interstate and foreign trade were affected in
violation of the Sherman Act.
American Tobacco was followed in 1913 by United States
30
v. Pacific & Artic Railway & Navigation Co. The Supreme
Court upheld the indictment of an American corporation and
several Canadian companies which had allegedly contrived
28. Id. at 356 (emphasis added).
29. 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
30. 228 U.S. 87 (1913).
to monopolize rail and steamship routes between Canada and
the United States. The Court reasoned that to deny juris-
diction, "would put the transportation route described in
the indictment out of the control of either Canada or the
United States."
3 1
32
In Thompsen v. Cayser, the court held that an asso-
ciation of steamship companies, formed in London in order
to monopolize the carriage of goods between the United
States and South Africa, was subject to the Sherman Act.
The Court noted that, "the combination affected the foreign
commerce of this country and was put into operation here."
' 3 3
In 1927, American Banana was further diluted by United
34
States v. Sisal Sales Corp. In Sisal the Supreme Court
affirmed an injunction issued under the Sherman Act and
section 73 of the Wilson Tariff Act. The defendants, sev-
eral American corporations and a Mexican company, pursuant
to an act by the Mexican legislature, conspired to monopo-
lize the importation of sisal into the United States. Dis-
tinguishing American Banana, Justice Reynolds remarked that
although most of the conspiratorial acts took place outside
the United States, there were, nevertheless, "forbidden
results within the United States."
'3 5
The increased stress placed on "results" produced with-
in the United States alluded to in Sisal was fully embraced
36
in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America. In Alcoa,
foreign aluminum ingot producers agreed to fix prices and
allocate aluminum production. The agreement was made in
31. Id. at 106.
32. 243 U.S. 66 (1971).
33. Id. at 88.
34. 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
35. Id. at 276.
36. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
Switzerland and, in effect, established export quotas. The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in an opinion by
Judge Learned Hand, determined that if extraterritorial
jurisdiction were not sustained, enforcement of United
States antitrust laws would be seriously impaired. Judge
Hand wrote, "any state may impose liabilities, even upon
persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its
borders that has consequences within its borders which the
state reprehends . . . ,,37 That edict became the basis of
the so-called "effects doctrine", one of the most contro-
versial elements of the foreign application of American
38
antitrust law. In essence, the Alcoa test, as developed,
is whether the effects produced within the United States are
intended or foreseeable. 3 9 If so proven, the burden then
shifts to the defendant who must show that no actual effects
occurred.
4 0
The "effects doctrine" was first squarely relied upon
in United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd.,
4 1
in which a British corporation and other foreign companies
agreed to allocate world chemical markets. The court stated,
"a conspiracy to divide territorities, which affects Ameri-
can commerce, violates the Sherman Act."
4 2
The "effects doctrine" was extended to perhaps its
ultimate reach in United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland
37. Id. at 443.
38. See Ongman, supra note 3, at 751 n.23.
39. 148 F.2d 416, 443-4 (2d Cir. 1945).
40. Id.
41. 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), final decree issued,
105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
42. 100 F. Supp. 504, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). For a re-
sounding British judicial rebuke of the American decision,
see British Nylon Spinners Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical Indus-
tries, Ltd., [1952] 2 All E.R. 780 (C.A.).
132
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Information Center, Inc. Swiss watch manufacturers and
their United States subsidiaries were ordered to dissolve a
cartel they had formed through what was termed a "gentle-
man's agreement". The cartel had the tacit approval of the
Swiss government. It restricted the export of American
watches to Switzerland and to areas where the market for
Swiss watches was strong. Restraints were also imposed on
the export of watch parts and watchmaking machinery to the
United States.
The court found that the cartel violated section 1 of
the Sherman Act and section 73 of the Wilson Tariff Act by
unreasonably restricting the manufacture, import and sale
of watches to the United States. Threats by the Swiss
government to take the case to the International Court of
Justice caused the United States Department of Justice to
request the American court to modify its order so as not to
interfere with Swiss internal economic policy.
Another line of cases, also pertaining to extraterri-
torial application of American economic laws, has begun to
erode the expansive reach permitted under the "effects
doctrine". The basis for these decisions is due process.
44
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, the Supreme
Court set forth a "minimum contacts" test which must be met
45
before in personam jurisdiction can be asserted. More
46
recently, in Shaffer v. Heitner, the Court articulated
the requirement that in a quasi in rem proceeding, a nexus
must exist between the cause of action and the subject
property.
43. 1963 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
44. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
45. See U.S. Const. amend. V.
46. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
In addition to considerations of due process, some
observers recently note a more deferential stance by the
American judiciary in applying United States antitrust law
abroad. Decisions such as Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of
47
America and Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corpora-
tion, 4 8 indicate that courts are beginning to weigh prin-
ciples of international law and comity in their delibera-
tions.
In Timberlane, an American lumber importer accused the
defendant of seeking to monopolize trade in Honduran lumber.
The plaintiff also alleged that the defendant had enlisted
the cooperation of a Honduran court that granted "embargoes"
49
against Timberlane's Honduran subsidiaries. In deciding the
case, Judge Choy found the Honduran court's connection with
the case factually too trivial to trigger the act of state
doctrine as a defense. 5 0 The significant feature of Timber-
lane is, however, the court's formulation of a three tiered
jurisdictional test, to be applied when acts of foreign
sovereigns are interfused with alleged antitrust violations:
IT]he antitrust laws require in the first instance
that there be some effect -- actual or intended --
on American foreign commerce before the federal
courts may legitimately exercise subject matter
jurisdiction under those statutes. Second, a
greater showing of burden or restraint may be
necessary to demonstrate that the effect is suf-
ficiently large to present cognizable injury to
the plaintiffs and, therefore, a civil violation
of the antitrust laws . . . . Third, there is
the additional question which is unique to the
international setting of whether the interests
of, and links to, the United States -- including
the magnitude of the effect on American commerce
47. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
48. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
49. "Embargo" is defined as a "court ordered attachment
registered with the Public Registry." 549 F.2d 597, 604-5
(9th Cir. 1976).
50. 549 F.2d 597, 606 (9th Cir. 1976).
-- are sufficiently strong vis-a-vis those of
other nations, to justify an assertion of extra-
territorial authority.
5 1
A similar approach was taken in Mannington Mills. The
plaintiff sought triple damages, alleging the defendant
fraudulently secured foreign patents and restrained export
trade by enforcing those patents in other countries. In
determining whether extraterritorial jurisdiction should be
exercised, the court set forth a comparative relations test
based on Timberlane. The test expanded the number of
factors weighed to ten, eight of which address transnational
issues.
5 2
The Seventh Circuit tacitly acknowledged the Timber-
lane and Mannington Mills tests in In re Uranium Antitrust
Litigation. 5 3 In Uranium, Westinghouse Electric Corporation
51. 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976) (emphasis in ori-
ginal; citations omitted).
52. Those factors are:
1. Degree of conflict with foreign law
or policy;
2. Nationality of the parties;
3. Relative importance of the alleged
violation of conduct here compared to that
abroad;
4. Availability of a remedy abroad and
the pendency of litigation there;
5. Existence of intent to harm or affect
American commerce and its foreseeability;
6. Possible effect upon foreign relations
if the court exercises jurisdiction and
grants relief;
7. If relief is granted, whether a party
will be placed in the position of being
forced to perform an act illegal in either
country or be under conflicting requirements
by both countries;
8. Whether the court can make its order
effective;
9. Whether an order for relief would be
acceptable in this country if made by the
foreign nation under similar circumstances;
10. Whether a treaty with the affected
nations has addressed the issue.
595 F.2d 1287, 1297 (3d Cir. 1979) (footnote omitted).
53. 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980).
accused the defendants of fixing world uranium prices and
attempting to divide global markets.5 4 In upholding the
district court's assumption of jurisdiction, the court of
appeals found no abuse of discretion, 5 5 noting that the Alcoa
test was the proper standard and that Mannington Mills was
not the law of the Seventh Circuit. 5 6 The opinion dismissed
the test articulated in Timberlane as "obiter dicta" but
pointed out that the jurisdictional "rule of reason" uti-
lized in Timberlane provides an adequate framework in which
to determine whether jurisdiction should be asserted.
5 7
As the federal courts slowly move toward greater aware-
ness of international law and comity in applying extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction in antitrust cases, the United States
Department of Justice is also shifting its position. In
1977, the Department issued its Antitrust Guide for Inter-
national Operations. 5 8  It recommends that in considering
whether American antitrust laws should be enforced outside
the United States, comity should be weighed to "avoid un-
necessary interference with the sovereign interests of
foreign nations."
5 9
The seeming trend toward increased ethnocentricity by
54. Westinghouse had long term contracts to supply
domestic and foreign utilities with uranium. In 1964, the
United States banned all imports of uranium. In retalia-
tion, the governments of Canada, France, South Africa,
Australia and Great Britain approved measures designed to
strengthen their uranium industries which caused the price
per pound of uranium to rise from $6 in 1972 to $40 in 1976.
As a result, Westinghouse abrogated its utility contracts
and claimed two billion dollars in damages. The company
used that amount as a foundation for a six billion dollar
triple damages action against the defendants.
55. 617 F.2d 1248, 1256 (7th Cir. 1980).
56. 617 F.2d 1255 (7th Cir. 1980).
57. Id. at n.25.
58. Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust
Guide for International Operations, reprinted in [1977-78
Extra Edition] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) No. 226 (1977).
59. Id. at 6-7.
American courts 6 0 and the Department of Justice is perceived
by other nations as superficial. Several United States
trading partners have enacted "blocking statutes". Typical-
ly, these laws have a dual purpose. First, they seek to
circumscribe the ability of American litigants to acquire
evidence, particularly commercial documents. Secondly, they
are designed to render enforcement of United States judg-
ments abroad ineffective.
IV. Foreign Statutory Enactments Designed to Block Extra-
territorial Application of United States Antitrust Law
A. The United Kingdom
The British consistently, and at times acrimoniously,
object to American attempts to prejudice English trading
interests through "long arm" enforcement of United States
commercial laws. In 1980, Parliament passed the Protection
of Trading Interests Act 1980.61 It is the most extensive
attempt by any nation to prevent foreign assertions of
extraterritorial jurisdiction. In the words of the British
Secretary for Trade, the Act was promulgated to "reassert
and reinforce the defenses of the United Kingdom against
attempts by other countries to enforce their economic and
commercial policies unilaterally on us."
6 2
Although the Act applies to all other nations, it is no
secret that it was fashioned principally to thwart encroach-
ments by the United States on British jurisdiction.
60. Although the courts in Timberlane and Mannington Mills
articulated concern for issues of international law and comity,
no court has yet denied jurisdiction on those grounds.
61. Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, c.ll, in
force, March 20, 1980.
62. 973 Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th ser.) 1533 (1979).
Disputes between the two nations on the issue date
back at least thirty years. In order to put the Protection
of Trading Interests Act 1980 into proper perspective, a
brief review of the Anglo-American conflict is instructive.
The genesis of the dispute centered around the ship-
ping industry. Since 1909, the British have permitted
"conferences" (cartels) between shipowners which, from the
English point of view, increase efficiency and stability.
6 3
Conferences are exempt from British legislation designed to
increase competition.
In form, the American approach seems similar. In sub-
stance, a broad disparity exists. The Alexander Report of
1914 acknowledged the desirability of cooperation between
shipowners and recommended that conference systems be par-
tially exempt from antitrust regulation. The Report was
64
adopted as section 15 of the Shipping Act of 1916, which
authorizes the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) to approve
all liner conference agreements. Exemptions from antitrust
law are conferred with FMC approval.
On its face, the American procedure appears to be quite
reasonable, however, several systemic refinements have pro-
voked conflict between the United States and other maritime
nations. First, American case law has extended the reach of
United States jurisdiction over foreign nationals, includ-
65
ing those located wholly outside the United States. Addi-
tionally, with respect to shipping conferences, the courts
63. See, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Shipping,
CMND No. 4337 at 115-46 (1970).
64. U.S. Shipping Act, ch. 451 § 15, 39 stat. 733 (1916)
(current version at 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1980)).
65. See, e.g., Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Con-
ference, 383 U.S. 213 (1966).
require the FMC to consider antitrust issues more carefully
66
before granting exemptions. Secondly, a philosophical
difference exists between English and American antitrust
remedies. The British regard American antitrust triple
67
damage awards as penal. Civil actions to enforce trade
68
restriction laws are virtually unknown in England. The
American private litigant seeking triple damages is perceived,
therefore, as an abnormal yet dangerous threat. Thirdly,
American discovery rules are far more comprehensive than
British counterparts. For example, the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Act 6 9 authorizes the service of
"civil investigative demands" on individuals, corporations
or third parties, including foreign nationals, not directly
under investigation. Discovery of documents procured from
a non-party to a suit using the procedure, carries with it
the potential hazard for the producing party of antitrust
prosecution should the Department of Justice find evidence
of a violation in the discovered information.
7 0
Several instances of Anglo-American disagreement stand-
out. In 1952, a federal grand jury investigated the foreign
66. Volkswagengewerk v. FMC, 390 U.S. 290 (1968).
67. We regard the civil action -- I refer here
to triple damages -- as being penal rather than
compensatory, and consequently consider that in
international dealings at least these proceedings
should be subject to the limitations that we
would regard as appropriate to criminal proceedings.
John Nott, Hansard H.C., col. 1151 (1979), reprinted in
Huntley, The Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980: Some
Jurisdictional Aspects of Enforcement of Antitrust Laws, 30
Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 213, 220 (T980) (hereinafter cited as
Huntley].
68. Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome (1958) as
incorporated into British law, might afford a private cause
of action, however, no English court has yet addressed the
issue.
69. 15 U.S.C. § 1312 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
70. That possibility was recognized in Rio Tinto Zinc
Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., [1978] 1 All E.R.
434, 458-9.
petroleum industry. Among the corporations examined was
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The British government
ordered the company not to produce any of the documents
sought by the grand jury. 71
In 1960, a United States grand jury investigation
7 2
focused on the shipping industry. It prompted eleven na-
tions and over two hundred foreign shipowners to dispute
the FMC's purported authority to require that documents,
not located in the United States and concerning commercial
transactions occurring outside the United States, be filed
with the FMC. The British formally protested twice during
the investigation.
7 3
Attempts to reconcile the opposing interests of the
United States and other maritime nations proved fruitless.
In 1964, the British Minister of Transport introduced in
the House of Commons the Shipping Contracts and Commercial
Documents Act 1964.7 The Act's purposes were twofold,
first to shelter British shipowners from broad American
claims of jurisdiction and secondly, to give the English
government some leverage with which to negotiate settle-
ments.
7 5
71. Her Majesty's Government consider it contrary
to international comity that you or your officers
should be required, in answer to a subpoena couched
in the widest terms, to produce documents which
are not only not in the United States of America,
but which do not even relate to business in that
country.
Reprinted in ILA supra note 5, at 569. An order from a
sovereign not to comply with a foreign court subpoena is
generally a valid defense for failure to produce the re-
quested evidence.
72. Re Grand Jury Investigation of the Shipping Industry,
186 F. Supp. 298 (D.D.C. 1960).
73. Reprinted in ILA supra note 5, at 404, 579, 582
(1964).
74. Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act 1964,
c.87, repealed by Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980,
c.1l § 8.
75. 698 Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th ser.) 1278 (1964).
The Act authorized the British Secretary of State to
forbid production of commercial information to foreign
courts or governmental agencies if to do so would "in-
fringe" on English jurisdiction. It therefore afforded
protection to British subjects under the act of state doc-
trine.
From 1964 to 1979, confrontational rhetoric between
the United States and Great Britain eased. American courts,
as in Timberlane, and Mannington Mills, evidenced increased
flexibility in their approach to the jurisdictional issue.
On the diplomatic front, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development arranged an agreement between
the United States and other seafaring nations concerning
statistical data the FMC desired to obtain from foreign
shipowners.7 6  The United States agreed that if the foreign
governments would use their good offices to acquire the in-
formation voluntarily, the FMC would not attempt to procure
it by asserting claims of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
The relative calm was shattered by two events. First,
Westinghouse Electric Corporation brought suit against a
British Company, Rio Tinto Zinc (RTZ), alleging that RTZ
was a member of an international uranium cartel.
7 7
Westinghouse attempted to elicit testimony from the
English directors of RTZ. Ultimately, the British House of
Lords had to decide whether the American courts had a right
to such evidence.7 8  The British Attorney General intervened
in the case, arguing strenuously that English sovereignty
76. OECD, Restrictive Business Practices of Multina-
tional Enterprises 61 passim (1942).
77. Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,
(1978] A.C. 434. See note 54 supra.
78. In re Westinghouse Uranium Contract, [1978] A.C. 547.
would be violated by a ruling to the contrary.
7 9
The Westinghouse litigation highlighted several weak-
nesses of the Shipping and Commercial Documents Act 1964,
most serious being the difficulty of proving an "infringe-
ment" of British jurisdiction. For that reason the Act
was not utilized by the British government to block RTZ's
directors' testimony, precipitating the need for a decision
by the House of Lords prohibiting the testimony on other
grounds. 80
A second reason for renewed conflict between the United
States and England again involved the shipping industry. In
81
1978, Congress passed a bill which permitted the FMC to
exclude a carrier from American ports for rebating on bills
of affreightment, a practice common to conference systems.
President Carter vetoed the bill, but a modified version was
82
enacted in 1979. Then, in June of that year, a federal
grand jury indicted a number of individuals and British
shipping lines alleging various criminal antitrust viola-
tions. 83 Several defendants entered pleas of nolo contendere
to avoid having to defend the action. They were assessed
the maximum fines allowable. 8 4 Subsequently, thirty private
79. Id. at 589-95.
80. The House of Lords held that the United States court's
investigation of the British company was a violation of
international law and contrary to the Evidence (Proceedings
in Other Jurisdictions) Act 1975, c.34 §§ l(b), 5(l)(b). In
re Westinghouse Uranium Contract, [1978] A.C. 547, 616-7,
650-1. The Law Lords were particularly concerned that in-
formation obtained in a civil action might be used by the
United States Department of Justice to initiate criminal anti-
trust actions against British corporations.
81. Act of June 5, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-25, 1979 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News (93 Stat.) 71.
82. 46 U.S.C. §§ 815-842 (Supp. IV 1980).
83. In re Ocean Shipping Antitrust Litigation, 500 F.
Supp. 1235 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
84. Id.
litigants filed triple damage actions based on the original
prosecution. The British government protested at each state
of the proceeding.
8 5
These events, coupled with a long history of confron-
tation and the election of a conservative government, pro-
pelled the Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980 into
existence. 86
The act took effect on March 20, 1980. It is divided
into eight sections. Section 1 requires persons affected
by "overseas measures" 8 7 to notify the Secretary of State.
The Secretary may prohibit compliance if he determines that
British trading interests would be otherwise adversely
effected. Section 1 is a virtual re-enactment of the Ship-
ping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act 1964, except
that dependence upon "jurisdictional infringement" is elim-
inated.
Section 2 covers commercial documents and other in-
formation. The Secretary of State may forbid compliance
with "requirements" 8 8 by foreign courts or authcrities to
85. 973 Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th ser.) 1538, 1551, 1589
(1979).
86. See generally Gordon, supra note 3; Huntley, supra
note 67; Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The
British Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, 75 Am. J.
Int'l L. 257 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Lowe]; Note,
British Restrictions on Enforcement of Foreign Judgments,
21 Harv. Int'l L.J. 727 (1980).
87. "Overseas measures" are defined as those "taken by
or under the law of any overseas country for regulation or
controlling international trade" if "they apply or would
apply to things done or to be done outside the territorial
jurisdiction of that country by persons carrying on busi-
ness in the United Kingdom". Protection of Trading Interests
Act 1980, c.11 § l(l)(a)-(l)(b).
88. "Requirements" are defined as either a request or
demand from "a foreign court or authority addressed to a
person in the United Kingdom or demand to produce documents
or information to a person specified in the requirement."
Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, c.l1 § 2(5).
produce evidence if located outside the territorial juris-
diction of the overseas authority.
8 9
Section 3 provides a maximum fine of £I,00090 for
failure to comply with orders issued by the Secretary of
State pursuant to the Act. 9 1  Section 3 does not apply to
"a person who is neither a citizen of the United Kingdom
and Colonies nor a body corporate incorporated in the
United Kingdom."
9 2
Section 4 supplements section 2 by superseding various
sections of the Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdic-
tions) Act 1975. 9 3 The thrust of section 4 is to ban pro-
duction of evidence in pre-trial discovery proceedings.
Section 5 forbids British courts from enforcing mul-
tiple damage awards9
4 
or compensatory antitrust judgments.9 5
Claims for contribution to damages are also disallowed. 96
The section anticipates actions brought under section 4 of
the Clayton Act.
Section 6 is called the "clawback" provision. It con-
tains the most novel aspect of the Act and from the American
viewpoint, the most controversial. It allows "qualifying
defendants'"9 7 to recover damages paid either voluntarily or
89. Section 2 was designed to stop so-called "fishing
expeditions", i.e., wide ranging requests for information
and documents in the hope that a violation will be reveal-
ed. See, e.g., Radio Corp. of America v. Rauland Corp.,
[1956] 1 All E.R. 549.
90. Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, c.ll § 3(4).
91. Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, c.ll § 3(3).
92. Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, c.i1 § 3(2).
93. Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act
1975, c.34.
94. Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, c.ll § 5(3).
95. Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, c.ll § 5(4).
96. Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, c.ll § 5(2).
97. "Qualifying defendants" are defined as, "citizens of
the United Kingdom or its territories, a body incorporated
therein, or a person conducting business in the United King-
dom." Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, c.ll § 6(3).
by attachment against property pursuant to a foreign judg-
98
ment. Section 6 applies only to the non-compensatory
element of any award and is recoverable directly from either
the successful plaintiff or a third party entitled to con-
tribution.9 9 It permits a British defendant that has paid
a triple damage award to a foreign plaintiff to recover
two-thirds of the judgment from any assets the foreign
plaintiff may have within British jurisdiction. Section 6
is a clear manifestation of British distain of private
triple damage actions.
During the bill's pendency in Parliament the United
States urged that section 6 be eliminated. In a diplomatic
note, the American government stated, "we do not understand
the theory under which . . . a United Kingdom court [should
be entitled to] undo what a United States court has done."
1 00
Although fears of American countermeasures were expressed in
l1
the Parliamentary debates, section 6 of the Act was passed
essentially as introduced.
Section 7 provides for reciprocal enforcement of foreign
judgments in the United Kingdom that correspond to section 6
102
judgments. In a sense, section 7 invites other countries
to enact similar legislation, allowing defendants who have
paid multiple damage awards to recover from a multinational
plaintiff in other than or in addition to the United Kingdom.
Section 8 is the Act's definitional section. It repeals
the Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act 1964.103
98. Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, c.ll § 6
(6)(a)(b).
99. Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, c.ll § 6(l).
100. Diplomatic Note No. 56 at 6 (Nov. 9, 1979), reprinted
in Lowe, supra note 85, at 278.
101. 976 Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th ser.) 1033 (1979).
102. Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, c.ll § 7(1).
103. Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, c.ll § 8(5).
B. Australia
A plaintiff, seeking redress under United States anti-
trust law against an Australian citizen or corporation,
must contend with two "blocking statutes."
Discovery is governed by the Foreign Proceedings
104
(Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act 1976. The Act
vests the Attorney General with broad discretion to restrict
both oral testimony and documentary production before for-
eign tribunals. The Attorney General may institute con-
trols if he determines that an overseas court is asserting
jurisdiction or powers that are inconsistent with inter-
national law, the comity of nations or when he is convinced
that restrictions are necessary to protect national inter-
105
ests. Judicial review of the Attorney General's decision
is not possible.
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Judgments are regulated by the Foreign Antitrust Judg-
107
ments (Restriction of Enforcement) Act 1979. Under it,
the Attorney General has discretionary authority to modify
or prohibit enforcement of foreign antitrust judgments in
Australia. Three conditions precedent limit that power.
He must be satisfied that either the judgment was (1) rend-
ered in a manner inconsistent with international law or
comity, or (2) that acquiescence to or enforcement of the
judgment would prejudice Australian domestic commercial
104. Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evi-
dence) Act No. 121, Austl. Acts (1976), as amended by Foreign
Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Amendment Act,
No. 202, Austl. Acts (1976), as implemented by Order of the
Attorney General, Austl. Gov't Gaz. No. S 214 (Nov. 29, 1976).
105. Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evi-
dence) Act No. 121, Austl. Acts (1976) § 4(l).
106. Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evi-
dence) Act No. 121, Austl. Acts (1976) § 4(2).
i07. Foreign Antitrust Judgments (Restriction of En-
forcement) Act No. 13, Austl. Acts (1979).
interests, or (3) that complete or partial recognition of
the judgment would jeopardize Australian international
trading interests.
In late 1981, an amendment to the Foreign Proceedings
(Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act 1976 was introduced
108
in the Australian Parliament. Clause 5 of the bill in-
corporates a "clawback" provision similar to section 6 of
the British Act. It would allow Australian citizens to
recover sums paid under a foreign antitrust judgment if the
Attorney General deems it entirely unenforceable in Aus-
tralia. The Attorney General would also have discretion to
decide whether the foreign judgment is only partially en-
forceable, in which case recovery would be limited to a
reduced amount. The amendment would go further than the
British Act, however, by permitting recovery not only from
a foreign plaintiff corporation, but also from companies af-
filiated with it having assets in Australia.
Clause 6 of the proposed amendment mirrors section 7
of the English Act in providing reciprocal enforcement
procedures to foreign citizens of countries with corres-
ponding legislation.
Currently, the United States Department of Justice and
the Australian Attorney General are conducting negotiations
seeking "an agreement which [will] lay down the framework
for consultation about the national interests involved be-
fore court proceedings are started."
' 1 0 9
C. Canada
Under a 1976 amendment to the Combines Investigation
108. Foreign Antitrust Judgments (Restriction of En-
forcement) Amendment Bill No. 150 (1981).
109. Huntley, supra note 67, at 233, quoting Financial
Times, Oct. 6, 1980.
110
Act, 1923, the Canadian Restrictive Trade Practices Com-
mission is authorized to order Canadian citizens to ignore
specific foreign laws or judgments on grounds of national
interest. The Commission determines which foreign laws or
judgments are counter to Canadian affairs.
The Canadian provinces have concurrent legislative
capacity with respect to foreign discovery requests and
111
judgment enforcement. Several have enacted their own
blocking statutes.
1 1 2
In 1981, a bill was introduced in the Canadian Parlia-
113
ment. It strongly resembles the British Protection of
Trading Interests Act 1980. Clause 3 of the bill would
authorize the Attorney General to forbid or limit the pro-
duction of records located either in Canada or under the
control of a Canadian citizen if, in his opinion, such dis-
closure would seriously compromise Canadian interests.
Failure to comply with the Attorney General's order would
give rise to criminal liability under clause 6.
Clause 5 affords additional assurance that records
subject to a clause 3 order will not be produced by allow-
ing Canadian courts to seize and store such records if
satisfied that the order might not be obeyed.
Enforcement of foreign antitrust judgments would be
subject to clause 7. Like the Australian bill, recognition
or enforcement would be contingent upon a determination by
the Attorney General that Canadian commercial interests
would not be endangered thereby. Should the Attorney Gen-
eral rule otherwise, the entire judgment could not be
110. Section 31.5 Can. Stat. 1914-75-76 c.76.
111. Section 92(14) British North American Act 1867.
112. See, e.g., Business Records Protection Act, (1947)
Ont. Stat. c.l0. (codified at Ont. Rev. Stat. c.54).
113. Bill c-41 (1981).
enforced in Canada.
Clause 8 would enable Canadian citizens and corpora-
tions to recover any amount paid pursuant to a judgment de-
clared void under clause 7. Citizens or corporations with
substantial connections to the country in which the judgment
was rendered would be excluded. The bill also proposes to
permit Canadian courts to order the seizure and sale of
securities of any Canadian corporation in which the entity
against whom recovery under clause 8 has been awarded has
either a direct or beneficial interest.
D. The Netherlands
In 1956, the Dutch enacted the Economic Competition
114
Act. Under article 39, an exemption must be obtained
from the Minister of Economic Affairs before Dutch citi-
zens can comply with foreign laws regulating commercial
competition.
The article was drafted specifically to counter en-
forcement of American antitrust law as applied in the
Netherlands. It has been invoked only against the United
States.
1 1 5
The Minister has authority to grant general, partial or
conditional exemptions. Willful compliance with foreign
antitrust laws or proceedings absent an exemption is a mis-
demeanor under the Economic Crimes Act.
1 1 6
E. France
In 1968, France enacted legislation preventing its
114. Wet Economishe Mededinging (June 28, 1956) Stb. 401
(amended June 29, 1977).
115. See Pettit & Styles, supra note 3, at 711.
116. Wet Economishe Delieten, arts. 6, 7, 8.
citizens from furnishing commercial information to foreign
governments if to do so would threaten national economic
117
interests or sovereignty. The 1968 law was primarily
aimed at thwarting investigations by the United States
Federal Maritime Commission.
An amendment to the statute became law on July 16,
118
1980. It forbids disclosure of virtually all types of
commercial information to foreign investigative agencies,
119
tribunals or natural or juridical persons.
Article 1 sets forth the prohibition and the criteria
under which it will be enforced. Information may not be
disclosed "which would threaten the sovereignty, security,
or essential economic interests of France or public order,
as defined by government authorities to the extent deemed
necessary. ,,120
Article 1 -- bis bars requests in writing or otherwise
for "information of an economic, commercial, industrial,
financial or technical nature, intended for the constitu-
tion of evidence in connection with pending or prospective
foreign judicial or administrative proceedings."
1 2 1
117. Law No. 68-678, [1968] J.0. 7267. The law's ori-
ginal purpose was to block investigations by the FMC; it
was later utilized to protect French industry as a whole.
The statute complemented the French reservation to the Hague
Convention of 1968, under which letters of request for pre-
trial discovery are not given effect.
118. Law No. 80-538, [1980] J.0. 1799. A translation of
the statute's title reads: "Laws Relating to the Communica-
tion of Economic, Commercial, Industrial, Financial or Tech-
nical Documents or Information to Foreign Natural or Legal
Persons." Herzog, The 1980 French Law on Documents and In-
formation, 75 Am. J. Int'l L. 382 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as Herzog]. See also Toms, The French Response to the Extra-
territorial Application of United States Antitrust Laws, 15
Int'l Law 585 (1981).
119. Law No. 80-538, [1980] J.0. 1799, art. 1.
120. Id., translated in Herzog, supra note 117, at 383.
121. Law No. 80-538, [1980] J.0. 1799, art. 1-bis,
translated in Herzog, supra note 117, at 383.
Under article 2, persons receiving requests or orders
for information from a foreign tribunal are required to
notify the relevant ministry immediately.
1 2 2
Criminal penalties are sanctioned under article 3.
Fines and prison sentences are authorized for any viola-
tion of article 1, however, no penalties are provided for
violations of article 2.123
Article 3's legislative history suggests that the
drafters felt that the possibility of criminal liability
could be u'ed by French defendants in the United States to
justify invocation of the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution as a defense for failure to produce
requested evidence.
1 2 4
The legislation was enacted hastily and is criticized
125
as being ambiguous. Judicial and administrative statu-
tory construction will be necessary before the full scope
of the law becomes apparent.
F. West Germany
German law prohibits execution of foreign requests for
testimony or documents without prior authorization by the
126
Federal Minister of Justice. The Minister may restrict
or otherwise condition the extent of disclosure allowed.
To date, no ordinances granting permission have been issued.
The de facto ban on disclosure is not as harsh as it
appears. In 1976, the United States and West Germany agreed
122. Law No. 80-538, [1980] J.0. 1799, art. 2.
123. Law No. 80-538, [1980] J.0. 1799, art. 3.
124. But see Societe Internationale pour Participan-
tions Industrielles et Commerciales v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197
(1958).
125. See, e.g., Herzog, supra note 117, at 383.
126. OLG MUnchen, Beschluss vom 31. 10.80, 9 VA 3/80.
to consult one another prior to making requests for informa-
tion. 1 2 7 That agreement is proving to be quite workable.
G. Italy
Generally, foreign discovery procedures will not be
given effect in Italy unless they comport with Italian
rules of civil or criminal procedure. Additionally, certain
professional groups cannot be compelled to reveal confi-
dential information obtained during the course of their
128
employment. These include: attorneys, public officials,
public employees, clerics, and physicians.
By recent legislative enactment, 1 2 9 shipowners cannot
honor foreign demands for commercial documents or other
maritime information, unless authorized to do so by the
Minister of Justice.
Foreign judgments deemed contrary to Italian public
policy, are not recognized or enforced in Italy. Non-
compensatory damage awards are not considered in accord with
Italian principles of justice. An American judgment for
triple damages could not, therefore, be executed in Italy,
although a "clawback" recovery would, theoretically, be
possible.
H. South Africa
Commercial information in any form cannot be divulged
to a foreign tribunal or litigant without prior consent by
127. Executive Agreement between the United States and
the Federal Republic of Germany (Agreement on Restrictive
Business Practices) June 23, 1976, United States -- Federal
Republic of Germany, 27 U.S.T. 1956, T.I.A.S. No. 8291.
128. C.P.C., art. 249; C.P.P., arts. 351, 352.
129. Act (No. 488) of July 24, 1980.
the Minister of Economic Affairs. 1 3 0 The Minister's per-
mission is also required before a foreign judgment can be
enforced in South Africa.
1 3 1
V. Conclusion
Ancient principles of sovereignty and territorial ju-
risdiction provide inadequate frameworks in which to resolve
modern disputes among nations with conflicting economic
regulatory schemes. Traditional concepts ignore the econo-
mic interdependence of states. The self-restraint of com-
ity, for example, is insufficiently defined to effectively
control the problems of concurrent jurisdiction posed by
modern multinational corporations.
Extraterritorial enforcement of American antitrust law
has brought these issues into sharp international focus.
The foreign statutory response has been extraordinary.
Despite almost universal condemnation, the United States has
yet to abandon its evangelical embrace of antitrust enforce-
ment. 132
Admittedly, there is evidence of increased American
sensitivity to the international repercussions involved.
1 3 3
The federal courts, as in Timberlane and Mannington Mills,
130. Protection of Business Act, No. 99 of 1978, as
amended by Protection of Business Amendment Act, No. 114 of
1979.
131. Id.
132. In a recent address, the Director of Planning of the
Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice,
expressed surprise that other nations have not emulated the
American approach. Joel Davidow, Extraterritorial Antitrust:
an American View, Address to the International Chamber of
Commerce, Paris, March 12, 1981.
133. The United States Departments of State and Justice
have requested federal courts to encourage foreign govern-
ments to file amicus curiae briefs in antitrust litigation
involving their nationals.
are beginning to recognize the need to weigh political and
international issues before deciding the merits of each
transnational antitrust case. But a judicial ad hoc ap-
proach is simply inadequate. Balancing legal, political
and foreign policy considerations along with the economic
consequences both here and abroad is beyond the competency
of even the most sophisticated federal judge.
If meaningful solutions are to be achieved, a new
"general theory of economic sovereignty" 134 should be
developed. Diplomatic negotiations resulting in either bi-
lateral treaties or international conventions 1 3 5 offer the
best solution.
There are signs that the United States is moving in
that direction. Attorney General William French Smith re-
cently stated:
We do not wish through our laws or their enforce-
ment to impair the sovereignty or rights of other
nations. We do not wish to police the world and
proscribe foreign conduct merely because it fails
to conform to our interests. Nevertheless, we
intend to influence the conduct of those inter-
national activities that have a foreseeable and
substantial impact on the legitimate concerns of
our people. In many instances, we trust that
multilateral or bilateral accords can ensure due
regard for our own interests as well as the inter-
ests of other governments and peoples.
1 3 6
Until agreements are concluded, continued American
attempts to extraterritorially enforce United States
134. Lowe, supra note 85, at 281.
135. The United Nations, through the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (U.N.C.T.A.D.) and the
Commission on Transnational Corporations are striving to
generate an international code of principles. One objective
is to control international restrictive business practices.
U.N. Commission on Transnational Corporations, Intergovern-
mental Working Group Report on the Formulation of a Code of
Conduct, 16 Int'l Legal Mats. 709 (1977).
136. Address by Attorney General, the Honorable William
French Smith, to the 29th Congress of the Union Internationale
des Avocats in New York, August 31, 1981, reprinted in Pettit
& Styles, supra note 3, at 715.
antitrust law will spawn new and more extensive foreign
statutory enactments. Agreements are necessary to guide
both the judiciary and our trading partners away from the
confrontational rhetoric of the past and toward a more
reasoned approach to antitrust enforcement.
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